Thumbnail Sketches of Other Jat BattalionsLast updated January 16, 2010
This is a holding area for information about other battalions until we have enough material for a separate battalion page.
Entries marked with a star are the work of Hamid Hussain. Other entries, unless marked, are the work of Ravi Rikhye.
2
Jat
Battle of Dhalai, East Bengal. 31st October
to 3rd November 1971. Was opposed by B/30th Frontier
Force in a series of fierce battles, losing 44 KIA and 89 WIA. The Pakistanis
lost 68 KIA from 30 FF and 89 from a militia company under command of B/30th
Frontier Force. The higher number of defender casualties occurred because a
second Indian infantry battalion participated, along with two artillery
regiments. The battalion was part of 61 Mountain Brigade, itself under XXXIII
Corps.
The battle as seen from Pakistan’s side, along with a lengthy analysis from 2 Jats’ side, is available at http://www.defencejournal.com/dec98/battle-dhalai.htm
*In
1971 war, 2 Jat was commanded by Lt. Colonel Dalal and 30 Frontier Force
(FF) was commanded by Lt. Colonel Ahmad Mukhtar Khan. Among 30 FF losses
was the battalion 2i/c Major Raja Javed Akhtar.
3
Jat
There were actually two battles for Dograi fought by 3
Jat, one on September 6, and the other on September 20-22.
Won fame in the Battle of Dograi, 1965. Was part of 54th
Brigade, 15th Infantry Division, XI Corps. Lt. Col. Desmond Hayde
IC-4036 September 6, 1965 MVC. Dograi was targeted because it was the site of
one of the 4 bridges across the Icholgil Canal. 3 Jat was to follow on 15th
Dogra to take the other side, establish a bridgehead for continuing to
offensive to Lahore. After 15 Dogra suffered heavy losses, 3 Jat was ordered
forward.
With
C/14th Horse, the battalion won through to Dograi, but found the bridge
across the Ichogil destroyed. Nonetheless, A and C Companies crossed the
river. A Company was counterattacked by Pakistan armor, and lacking any AT
weapons, was forced back to the canal's east bank. With C/14 Horse fighting
from the east bank, A Company went back to the west bank. Now it had to be
withdrawn for lack of AT weapons. Meanwhile, the brigade commander, without a
link to the battalion, could not tell what was happening and ordered the
battalion to withdraw east, partly because it was getting on in the day and
he did not want the battalion left defenseless at night, well inside enemy
territory. Accordingly, C Company was also withdrawn.
Meanwhile,
learning that Dograi had been captured, GOC 15 Division went to the Brigade
HQ. Learning that the battalion was withdrawing, he ordered Brigade to
countermand the withdrawal, but as Brigade could use only the tanks' links,
he got through too late and the Jats had already passed through C/14 Horse.
To
complicate matters, after learning Dograi was being evacuated, the Corps and
Army Commanders both reached the division command post. The state of Indian
Army field communications can be understood in yet another example: GOC 15th
Division had no idea that 1st Jat, supposedly protecting his north
flank, had been forced back from the Ichogil Canal
The
battalion fought under adverse circumstances. They had no radio link with
brigade HQ as the rear link could not be brought up; nor have an artillery
FOO attached. Orders were being conveyed from Brigade though the tanks'
radio-link.
Major
A.R. Tyagi IC-13056 MVC Posthumous September 21, 1965. Captain Kapil Singh
Thapa IC-14608 MVC Posthumous September 31, 1965. Subedhar Khazan Singh
JC-8199 Vr.C. Posthumous September 6, 1965. *All companies of 3 Jat fought battles with elite Pakistani battalions in the sector. A company led by Major Asha Ram Tyagi locked horns with 8 Punjab and 16 Punjab of Pakistan army. Tyagi was killed in action. B company led by Major Sandhu fought with a platoon of 3 Baloch (commanding officer of 3 Baloch was indomitable Lieutenant Colonel Tajjamul Hussain who again gave tough time to Indians in a battle six years later in 1971 war at Hilli commanding a brigade). C company led by Major Yadav fought an epic company level intense battle with a company of 18 Baloch (now 3 Sindh). Large number of soldiers of both 3 Jat and 18 Baloch died in close quarter battle including hand to hand fight. 3 Jat put up a very good show against Pakistan’s 16 Punjab which was exhausted due to continuous operations. In the firefight, Jats bagged about 50 prisoners including commanding officer of 16 Punjab Lt. Colonel G.F. Golwala. About 100 soldiers of 16 Punjab were able to cross the canal into 3 Baloch area. 3 Jat held on to their positions when 1 Baloch launched a ferocious counter attack. 1 Baloch had over one hundred casualties in less than an hour. Total losses of 3 Jat were 58 killed including four officers and 157 wounded including six officers. Further details of
Second Dograi and the context for 3 Jats operations can be found in excerpts
from
The 1965 war, the inside story: Defence Minister
Y.B. Chavan's diary of India By R. D. Pradhan,
pages 79-81, as available in Google Books.
1971:
The battalion was under Southern Command in the desert. No further details at
this time.
1971
*In
1971 war in Suleimanki /Fazilka sector, 4 Jat (part of 67th
Infantry Brigade) was in the area defended by elite Pakistani
battalions (6FF, 7 Punjab and 18 Baloch of 105th
Independent Infantry Brigade). Indian army Chief General Sam
Manekshaw was commissioned in 6 FF then known as 4/12 Frontier Force
Regiment. He fought in Second World War as a PIFFER. He was
severely wounded and won a Military Cross. In 1947, when Frontier
Force Regiment and Rifles were allotted to Pakistan, Sam joined
Gurkha regiment.
During 1971 war, he would ask during briefings about performance of
his old battalion 6 FF now fighting from Pakistani side. He told
his military secretary that he wished one of his Gurkha battalions
take on 6 FF. However, this honor went to 4 Jat. B company of 6FF
was led by Major Shabbir Sharif. Earlier Sharif’s company had given
3 Assam run for their money and captured their positions. The
counter attacks on Pakistani positions were from equally worthy
adversaries of 3 Assam (39 casualties) and 15 Rajput (70 casualties)
battalions. However, the most determined counter attack was from 4
Jat. 4 Jat company commander Major Narayan Singh with few of his
men penetrated 6 FF positions and was killed in hand to hand fight.
Next day his brave adversary Major Shabbir Sharif was also killed in
action. 4 Jat suffered 69 casualties in this battle. This was
quite a bloody affair where Indian losses were about 200 killed and
about 400 wounded. A thankful nation paid their tribute to the
defenders by erecting Asafwala war memorial in Fazilka in memory of
67th Infantry Brigade. 1988-90: Sri Lanka 1994: Nagaland * 1999:
In
1999 Kargil conflict, Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia and five soldiers of
4 Jat were the first casualties of the conflict when their patrol
was ambushed in Kaksar area. Later, two more patrols of 4 Jat led
by Lieutenant Amit Bhardwaj and Major Vikram Singh Shekhawat were
sent and they also suffered casualties. 5 Jat 1962: Ladakh
6
Jat
1965: 162nd Brigade, 26th
Division 1993-1994: Siachin
7
Jat
1965: 162nd Brigade 26th Division
1997: Jammu and Kashmir Counter Insurgency
8
Jat
1971: Banwat
sector, south of Poonch [93rd
Brigade, 25th Division, XV Corps]
9 Jat1971: Second Battle for Chaamb [first was in 1965], [191st Brigade, 10th Infantry Division]
10 Jat
Regimental training center.
11 Jat
1988-89: Siachin
12 Jat
Served in Sri Lanka 12th June 1988 to January 1990, and in Siachen 1998-99.
14
Jat
1965 served with 120th Brigade, 25th
Division, XV Corps
15 Jat
16 Jat
Served in Siachen 1990-91.
17
Jat
17 Jat participated in Drass sector during this conflict.
18 Jat
19 Jat
20 Jat
Served in Siachen 1990-91 (1989-1990?)
21 Jat
Served in
Siachen 1991-92. |