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Sketches of Other Jat Battalions
This is a holding area for information about other battalions
until we have enough material for a separate battalion page. 1
Jat
1965: Fought under 38th Brigade of 15th
Infantry Division, XI Corps. Supported by two troops A/14th Horse,
it came under command of GOC 15th Division and operated along
route Amritsar-Lopoke-Kakkar-Ranian to block any Pakistani attempt to
outflank 15th Division 2
Jat
Battle of Dhalai, East Bengal. 31st October
to 3rd November 1971. Was opposed by B/30th Frontier
Force in a series of fierce battles, losing 44 KIA and 89 WIA. The Pakistanis
lost 68 KIA from 30 FF and 89 from a militia company under command of B/30th
Frontier Force. The higher number of defender casualties occurred because a
second Indian infantry battalion participated, along with two artillery
regiments. The battalion was part of 61 Mountain Brigade, itself under XXXIII
Corps. The battle as seen from Pakistan’s side, along with a
lengthy analysis from 2 Jats’ side, is available at http://www.defencejournal.com/dec98/battle-dhalai.htm
3
Jat
There were actually two battles for Dograi fought by 3
Jat, one on September 6, and the other on September 20-22. Won fame in the Battle of Dograi, 1965. Was part of 54th
Brigade, 15th Infantry Division, XI Corps. Lt. Col. Desmond Hayde
IC-4036 September 6, 1965 MVC. Dograi was targeted because it was the site of
one of the 4 bridges across the Icholgil Canal. 3 Jat was to follow on 15th
Dogra to take the other side, establish a bridgehead for continuing to
offensive to Lahore. After 15 Dogra suffered heavy losses, 3 Jat was ordered
forward. With
C/14th Horse, the battalion won through to Dograi, but found the bridge
across the Ichogil destroyers. Nonetheless, A and C Companies crossed the
river. A Company was counterattacked by Pakistan armor, and lacking any AT
weapons, was forced back to the canal's east bank. With C/14 Horse fighting
from the east bank, A Company went back to the west bank. Now it had to be
withdrawn for lack of AT weapons. Meanwhile, the brigade commander, without a
link to the battalion, could not tell what was happening and ordered the
battalion to withdraw east, partly because it was getting on in the day and
he did not want the battalion left defenseless at night, well inside enemy
territory. Accordingly, C Company was also withdrawn. Meanwhile,
learning that Dograi had been captured, GOC 15 Division went to the Brigade
HQ. Learning that the battalion was withdrawing, he ordered Brigade to
countermand the withdrawal, but as Brigade could use only the tanks' links,
he got through too late and the Jats had already passed through C/14 Horse. To
complicate matters, after learning Dograi was being evacuated, the Corps and
Army Commanders both reached the division command post. The state of Indian
Army field communications can be understood in yet another example: GOC 15th
Division had no idea that 1st Jat, supposedly protecting his north
flank, had been forced back from the Ichogil Canal The
battalion fought under adverse circumstances. They had no radio link with
brigade HQ as the rear link could not be brought up; nor have an artillery
FOO attached. Orders were being conveyed from Brigade theough the tanks'
radio-link. Major
A.R. Tyagi IC-13056 MVC Posthumous September 21, 1965. Captain Kapil Singh
Thapa IC-14608 MVC Posthumous September 31, 1965. Subedhar Khazan Singh
JC-8199 Vr.C. Posthumous September 6, 1965. 1971:
The battalion was under Southern Command in the desert. No further details at
this time. 6
Jat
1965 with 162nd Brigade, 26th
Division 7
Jat
1965: 162nd Brigade 26th Division 8
Jat
1971: Banwat
sector, south of Poonch [93rd
Brigade, 25th Division, XV Corps] 9
Jats
1971: Second Battle for Chaamb [first was in 1965], [191st
Brigade, 10th Infantry Division] 14
Jat
1965 served with 120th Brigade, 25th
Division, XV Corps 17
Jat
Outstanding service in Kargil, 1999 |